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Introduction
Along her life cycle, an individual is repeatedly exposed to a wide variety of idiosyncratic
shocks, like health or displacement shocks, as well as aggregate shocks, like economic
turmoil, political conflicts, or climate change. These shocks may cause a transitory or
permanent wealth loss. When information is imperfect and credit market are constrained,
households cannot smooth their consumption along the life cycle. Shocks come at cost
in terms of well-being, unless they develop original coping strategies.
The economic literature on coping strategies usually stresses out the distinction
between ex ante and ex post risk coping mechanisms. Though response mechanisms
vary greatly according to local specificities and types of shock, they can be summed up
into three categories. Adjustment strategies consist in modifying consumption patterns,
selling assets or allocating more time to home production. In Zimbabwe, individuals
responded to drought by selling cattle in a consistent way with long term livestock ac-
cumulation objectives (Kinsey et al., 1998). During the 1998 financial crisis in Russia,
middle and lower class households decreased their consumption of normal goods (Lokshin
and Yemtsov, 2004). In the aftermath of the 2001 Argentine economic crisis, individuals
allocated a larger amount of their leisure time to shopping activities, with the aim to
track down information on available goods and best prices (McKenzie and Schargrodsky,
2011). Network strategies rely on the social capital accumulated by individuals. For
instance, sharing a network with family or friends who migrated enables an individual
to cash in remittances during hard times (Mohapatra et al., 2012), and also facilitates
own migration. In Botswana, urban migrants keep their former rural network and assets
as a safety net against uncertain urban prospects (Krueger, 1998). Informal insurance
between households also allows for a monetary or non monetary redistribution, as in the
case of US, where young actives move in and out of the parental home depending on
labor market risks (Kaplan, 2012). Finally, active strategies regroup labor market ori-
ented strategies, like double shift jobs, informal secondary occupation, or selling of home
production. For example, in rural India, Kochar (1999) shows that individuals switch
from farm to off-farm activities with climate shocks.
Clearly, household formation plays an important role in all coping responses against
risks and shocks. Indeed, insurance is one of the traditional functions of marriage, in so
far it allows for ex ante risk diversification. In addition, shock coping decisions taken at
the intra-household level are de facto more flexible than the set of strategies available
to a single individual, because households are assumed to pool their resources in time
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and income.2 This is particularly the case for market-oriented strategies. Indeed, single
individuals can only increase their labor supply at the intensive margin. On the opposite,
households can extend their labor supply by having one or more extra members entering
the labor market. Taking its origin in Woytinsky (1940), the added worker effect hypoth-
esis (henceforth AWE) states that in the eventuality of a shock on the primary earner in
the household, secondary workers would enter the labor market as imperfect substitutes
to smooth consumption profile at the household level.
In theory, assuming complete markets and perfect information, the AWE is expected
to be small for two reasons. At the individual level, the first life cycle models show that
the income reduction from a temporary shock is negligible in relation to lifetime income
(Heckman and Macurdy, 1980). Intertemporal allocation of other members’ time should
thus not be too distorted by the transitory unemployment spell or income shock hitting
the household head. Second, at the aggregate level, a discouraged worker effect should
prevail over the added worker effect: even if spouses individually increase their labor
market participation in response to a negative shock affecting the household head, the
depressed economy is expected to drive even more spouses to withdraw from the labor
market, the overall impact of the negative shock on additional workers’ participation thus
being negative.
However, in practice, the magnitude of the AWE depends on several factors, namely
the availability of alternative strategies to smooth income loss; the degree of imperfection
of markets for credit and liquidity constraint limiting access to consumption smoothing
through borrowing (Bingley and Walker, 2001); the perception of unemployment shocks
as a new information about negative lifetime income prospects (Dynarski and Sheffrin,
1987). Taking this uncertainty into account, Stephens (2002) extends the life cycle model
of labor supply under uncertainty of MaCurdy (1985) to a two adult household, allow-
ing for a substantial temporary added-worker effect to arise. Empirically, the literature
testing the existence of this AWE reports mixed evidence. While early, seminal studies
established that transitory shocks on husband’s labor market outcomes have an impact
on their spouse’s labor supply, other studies failed to highlight any significant effect. Re-
cent developments in the literature on AWE explain this inability to reach a consensus
by several methodological issues, namely the differences in the definition of the AWE
(or in the underlying labor supply model), and weaknesses in the identification strat-
egy. Taking these flaws into account, the most recent studies tend to favor the AWE
2This income pooling hypothesis corresponds to a unitary conception of the household. Collective
models have proven their empirical consistency and repeatedly rejected full income pooling (see e.g.
Duflo and Udry (2004)). However, in this paper, we adopt a unitary framework. Sadly, our dataset does
provide the necessary information to test the adequacy of the unitary model.
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hypothesis. Using panel data to investigate fluctuations in child labor and schooling at-
tendance in rural India, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show that child labor varies with
income shocks, suggesting that child labor does cope against adverse economic shocks.
In Tanzania, Beegle et al. (2006) find that transitory income shocks lead to increases
in child labor, particularly in households who have no asset. The effect also appears in
developed economies, mostly in cases where access to social security is limited (Cullen
and Gruber, 2000; Hardoy and Schoene, 2013), as well as where the tax system is not
too discouraging for the participation of married women activity (Harkness and Evans,
2011). Using PSID data from 1968 to 1992, Stephens (2002) revisits the AWE in the US
and shows that the number of working hours of married women increases by as much as
11 percent in the four years following their husband’s displacement. In Japan, over the
period 1993-2004, the AWE accounts for 2.1 to 2.7 percent of the increase in married
women labor market participation (Kohara, 2010). Between 2001 and 2007, Australian
women with husband experiencing a job loss are 2.8 percentage points more likely to be
employed full time than similar women with employed husband (Gong, 2011). During the
2007-2009 recession in the US, a married woman with displaced husband is 4 percentage
points more likely to participate in the labor market than her counterpart married to an
employed husband (Starr, 2013).
In Argentina, the AWE hypothesis is generally acknowledged as a main explanatory
factor explaining the increase in labor market participation of married women after 1990
(Ministerio del Trabajo, 2005). Between 1970 and 1990, following the same trend as other
countries in the Cono Sur (Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), female participation rate
rose from 31.4 to 50.2 percent of the female working age population. However, before
1985, this trend was mainly driven by traditional factors, namely changes in fertility and
education, combined with a structural change in economic activities towards services. In
the aftermath of the 1989 hyperinflation, a series of liberal measures were undertaken,
implying waves of privatization and labor market flexibility measures, which created the
conditions for economic growth, at the cost of a burst in unemployment. The increase in
unemployment coexisted with an increase in married women participation, giving credit
to the AWE hypothesis. Building on this stylized fact, Cerrutti (2000) explores the
relationship between the increasing employment instability of male heads of household
and the increasing female labor force participation using panel data. She finds that
between 1991 and 1994, in the Great Buenos Aires area, a married woman whose husband
experiences instability in his employment status is twice as likely to enter the labor market
than a woman whose husband remains employed over time.
However, this positive correlation between a growing husband unemployment rate
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and female labor market participation faded out in the second half of the decade. In
2001, male unemployment rate kept up with its historically high 1995 level, whereas
female participation slightly decreased. Did the AWE disappear completely? Could
it be that the 1991-1994 AWE exhausted the stock of married women with the lowest
reservation wages? Or did the discouraged worker effect prevail over the AWE at the
aggregate level?3
Using the Encuesta permanente de hogares (EPH) panel data between 2000 and
2002, this paper aims at assessing the existence and magnitude of the AWE during the
2001 economic crisis in Argentina. Identifying the causal effect of a household head un-
employment or income loss on his spouse’s labor market outcomes is challenging because
spouses simultaneously allocate their time between leisure, home and market production
according to a utility function including both spouses’ preferences. Female labor supply is
the result of a household maximisation process that evolves taking into account changes
in market wages and tastes, or alternatively the result of a bargaining process in case of
a collective intra-household labor supply model.4 Without a proper identification strat-
egy, the AWE would spuriously account for these decisions that are not coping strategies
against unexpected shocks.
In this paper, we take advantage of the 2001-2002 sudden crisis episode in Argentina.
During the 1990s, Argentina was indeed presented as the IMF’s model pupil. Under
President Carlos Menem and Minister of Finance Domingo Cavallo, a set of neoliberal
measures were undertaken from 1991 onwards to restore trust into the domestic currency,
to foster foreign investments flows and to fight against hyperinflation. In April 1991, the
Convertibility plan established a currency board that irremediably pegged the Argentine
peso to the US dollar. The main achievement of this currency board has been to durably
contain inflation – the pest of Argentine economy for decades, and restore trust into the
domestic currency. The 1990s were a period of sustained economic growth, and Cavallo
consequently gained a huge popularity among the middle class.5 However, from 1999
3In their study of the AWE in Spain between 1968-2007, Congregado et al. (2011) find that the AWE
dominates the discouraged worker effect, but only when unemployment is below a 11 percent threshold.
Above this threshold, the two effects cancel each other out: married women participation rate is not
influenced by further deterioration of economic conditions. If this is the case, the AWE disappears at
the aggregate data level, but should still be observed at the individual data level.
4For example, if the leisure of both spouses are substitutes, the correlation between the labor supply
decisions of both spouses within the household simply picks up the intra-household decision process
where husbands and wives commonly decide of a new allocation set between labor and leisure, keeping
the overall household welfare constant.
5An exception is the 1995 recession. It corresponds to the Mexican ‘Tequila’ crisis affecting the whole
region.
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onward, a combination of external and internal factors made it increasingly difficult for
an Argentina in moderate recession to sustain the Convertibility regime (Fanelli, 2002).
Nonetheless, throughout the difficulties, Argentina was repeatedly backed by the IMF.
The situation suddenly escalated from November 2001 onwards. The highly unpopular
corralito measure – consisting in freezing banking accounts to limit possibilities of a bank
run – and the sudden stop to the Argentine financial support decided by the IMF a few
days later triggered the social, political and economic collapse of December 2001. The
sudden end of the Convertibility era in January 2002 creates an unanticipated shock,
asymmetrically affecting the different economic sectors. This exogenous, asymmetric
variation is exploited as an instrument for the observed variations in labor earnings and
employment status of the household head. The EPH database provides information
on households directly before and after the sudden collapse of the Convertibility. By
selecting the variations in income and unemployment that are unrelated to the classical
intrahousehold bargaining process, the IV estimation allows for a causal identification:
under the common trend and exclusion restriction assumptions, this estimation strategy
yields an unbiased estimate of the AWE in Argentina.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold. A first distinguishing feature
of this paper is its innovative identification strategy. The fact that panel data are an
absolute requirement for studying household-level labor supply responses to shocks is
well-known, and has been repeatedly assessed in the literature (MaCurdy, 1985; Blundell
and Macurdy, 1999; Stephens, 2002). Nonetheless, studying the effects of an economic
shock in emerging countries rarely involves panel data analyses. A notable exception to
this criticism is Cerrutti (2000)’s paper on the AWE in the Great Buenos Aires area.
However, in our view, even when using panel data, the estimated positive correlation
between the household head’s employment stability and the married woman’s entry on
the labor market captures other effects unrelated to the AWE. First, such a correlation
appears whenever spouses’ leisure times are substitutes, which would be unrelated to
shock coping. Second, Cerrutti (2000)’s variable of interest is a dummy standing for
changes in the occupation status of the household head (job loss and job entry), not just
job loss. This is problematic, because it makes it impossible to see whether the positive
correlation means that female labor supply acts as a counter or rather procyclical force
with respect to the decline in family earnings due to the primary earner income loss.
Our paper adds an IV strategy to the use of panel data in order to identify the AWE.
Natural experiment settings using economic shocks to reveal strategical responses from
households are still sparse, though promising methods (Yang, 2008). To our knowledge,
this paper is among the very few relying on an IV strategy to causally estimate the AWE.6
6Interestingly, parallel to our paper, a recent study by Ayhan (2014) investigates the AWE in Turkey.
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Second, this paper adds to the existing literature on female labor supply and intra-
household decision process by collecting information on labor supply decisions in an
emerging economy. So far, the AWE was predominantly computed for industrialized
countries, leaving aside the developing world, where the family is assumed to play an
important shock coping role in the absence of a universal social safety net. Understanding
the process by which household labor allocation occurs is important for policy and project
design (Haddad et al., 1997), as indirect implications of this increase in participation are
unclear for own and other household members’ welfare (Lim, 2000; Klasen and Pieters,
2012).
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on AWE by stating the clear dis-
tinction between its aggregate and micro dimensions. It untangles the fact that the AWE
at the micro level is a necessary condition for the macroeconomic AWE to exist, but
that the reverse does not necessarily hold. The concept of AWE confusingly builds on
two very different strands of literature that should not be assimilated. We show that the
AWE should not be discarded as a candidate to understand the labor supply decisions
of Argentine women, even if the negative correlation between labor outcomes of married
spouses washes out at the aggregate level.
Our findings suggest that in the absence of a sufficient safety net, shock coping is
still one of the functions of marriage. A simple regression analysis using individual fixed
effects reveals that the average 32 percent decrease in husband real monthly labor income
is associated with a 0.55 percentage point increase in married women participation, which
represents half of the variation observed over the period at the aggregate level. A woman
whose husband looses his job is 7.3 percentage points more likely to enter the labor
market, 4 percentage points more likely to find an occupation, and almost 2 percentage
points more likely to work full-time. When instrumenting for husband labor market
outcomes, we find that the causal effect of a negative shock affecting the household is
even higher. On average, married women are 4.4 percentage points more likely to supply
labor at the extensive margin. If we adopt stricter definitions of participation, the effect
still accounts for a 2.1 percentage points increase in married women participation over the
period. In spite of the constraint on the demand side of the labor market, married women
whose husband experiences the average decline in labor earnings still have a 1 percentage
point higher probability to find a full time job. When a household head experiences
an unexpected displacement, his spouse is 43 percentage points more likely to enter the
labor market, and 35 percentage points more likely to be employed. At the intensive
It exploits the 2008 economic crisis, and instruments the displacement of the household head with the
variation in the production level of the male-dominated sectors induced by the crisis.
6
margin, the results are in line with expectations, but the pattern is less clear-cut. On
average, following the job loss of their husband, four out of ten employed women express
the willingness to work more hours. However, they face a constrained demand and this
willingness to work does not effectively translate into more hours. In addition, interesting
wealth and income effects arise when studying heterogeneities in the AWE.
Section 1 briefly recalls the theoretical background under the concept and the mech-
anism of the ‘added worker’. Section 2 details the empirical strategy, gives key elements
of the Argentine political and economic context, and outlines the construction of the
instrument sets. Section 3 presents the dataset. Section 4 displays and comments the
main results. Section 5 conducts a sensitivity analysis and various robustness checks.
Section 6 gives insights on heterogeneous effects within the AWE. Last section sums up
the results and concludes.
1 Transitory income shocks and changes in house-
hold labor supply: theoretical considerations
Female labor supply has been increasing steadily during the last century. From this
standpoint, three topics are particularly relevant (Mincer, 1962; Killingsworth and Heck-
man, 1986): the role of the family, the allocation of time between market, non market
activities, and leisure, and the heterogeneity of human capital and available jobs. The
study of the AWE clearly relates to the role of the family. Does the marriage work as a
compensation mechanism against adverse economic shocks? What is the motivation for
shifts in labor supply: leisure complementarities, variations in the relative labor market
opportunities of household members, an income diversification in situation of perceived
higher risk, or a strategic response to shocks? Does the labor supply of other family
members allow to compensate an income loss? So far, the existing empirical studies have
built on a variety of theoretical settings to try to pin down the AWE. In what follows,
we briefly sketch the theoretical labor supply model behind our empirical analysis.
In the static model (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986), a negative shock on the
income of the household head reduces the relative value of his spouse non-market time,
and as such foster a reallocation of the labor supply within the couple toward the spouse.
However, the opportunity cost of leisure decreases with economic opportunities. If the
shock affecting the income of the household head is aggregate, then the added worker
effect may well be mitigated by an income effect, or the so called discouragement effect.
Since the additional labor supply provided by the spouse is one out of many options for
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a household to adjust for a loss in income, its importance is linked with the availability
of alternative coping strategies: a more intensive job search by the husband or other
household members, access to credit or financial support from the community, capital
destruction, and so on.
In a life-cycle model, the added worker effect does not show up. Indeed, the transi-
tory component of the income does not come into play, and the labor supply only responds
to declines in permanent income (MaCurdy, 1981). Nonetheless, if uncertainty is postu-
lated and introduced into the model, the labor supply can vary even in the presence of
temporary shocks, because the shocks now convey information on the earning prospects
and as such have an impact the marginal effect of wealth across periods (MaCurdy, 1985).
Accordingly, the theoretical background of this paper is a unitary household life cy-
cle model of labor supply under uncertainty, extended to the household case by Stephens
(2002). In short, life-cycle modeling under uncertainty extends the standard static, de-
terministic models introducing life-time and randomness through the marginal utility of
wealth. The static budget constraint is replaced by an asset accumulation path con-
straint. The Lagrange multiplier no longer represents the marginal utility of income
but the marginal utility of wealth. Finally, uncertainty is introduced into the model by
allowing the marginal utility of wealth to follow a stochastic process over the lifetime.
Assume a household composed of two working age individuals. The household utility
is quasi-concave, and depends on consumption C, working hours of its two members Hj,
j = h,w and shifts in preferences Z. Typically, taste shifters for labor-leisure trade-off
include children as observed variables, or health status and taste for work as unobserved
variables: Zit = Xit + vit. The price of consumption good is normalized to 1. The
household utility in a life-cycle setting depends of present and future values of C, Hj
and Z. For tractability, utility separability in time is assumed. At age t, the household
optimization program is:
maxUt = Et
[
T∑
s=t
δs−tUs(Cs, Hhs , H
w
s , Zs)
]
(1)
For simplicity, the model realistically assumes T to be known by agents. The
maximization of utility is subject to a budget constraint described by the time path of
asset accumulation and a terminal condition:
At+1 = (1 + rt+1)(At +Bt +W
h
t H
h
t +W
w
t H
w
t − Ct) (2a)
AT ≥ 0 (2b)
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with At the real value of assets in t, Bt the non-labor, non-asset income, W
j
t the
hourly wage rate for household member j = h,w, and Yt the household non-labor income.
Under dynamic programming, expression (1) is reformulated as the consumer’s value
function.
V (At, t) = maxU [(Ct, H1t, H2t, Zt + δEt[V (At+1, t+ 1)]] (3)
At age t, consumers choose their values of C and Hi subject to (2a). First order
conditions yield:
∂U
∂C
(
Ct, H
h
t , H
w
t , Zt
)
= λt (4a)
− ∂U
∂Hht
(
Ct, H
h
t , H
w
t , Zt
) ≥ λtW ht (4b)
− ∂U
∂Hwt
(
Ct, H
h
t , H
w
t , Zt
) ≥ λtWwt (4c)
λt = δEt[(1 + rt+1)λt+1] (4d)
The first three conditions are similar to the static labor supply case, with the
important distinction that λt now describes the marginal utility of wealth at age t, and not
the marginal utility of labor income. At age t, the household chooses its consumption level
so that the last unit consumed costs as much as giving up a unit of savings (equation (4a)).
Conditions (4b) and (4c) reveal which quantity of labor will maximize household utility,
preference for leisure being allowed to vary among family members. If the inequality holds
strictly for member j, all of his time L¯ is allocated to leisure, and j supplies no hours of
work. Finally, the Euler equation in (4d) describes the allocation rule for wealth across
the life-cycle under uncertainty. Households determine their labor supply, consumption
and savings in order to equalize the marginal utility of wealth λt in current period t with
the expected discounted value of marginal utility of wealth in t+ 1.
When a household head experiences a negative shock on his earnings W ht , his
spouse’s labor supply first reacts through a cross wage effect implied by (4b) and (4c):
holding λt constant, the wife responds to a change in W
h
t . The sign of this adjustment is
ambiguous, because it depends on leisure complementarities between spouses.
In addition, under uncertainty, the labor supply of the wife responds to another
argument: λt, according to a wealth effect described in (4d). Recall that under perfect
certainty, λt simply summarizes all information about lifetime wages and property income
outside the decision period that a consumer needs in order to determine his optimal
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current consumption and labor supply (MaCurdy, 1981). By definition, no wealth effect
on the labor supply of married women is to be observed, since the life cycle wage profile is
known by households. Under uncertainty, unanticipated shocks are introduced through
the marginal utility of wealth, which now follows a stochastic process. Variations in
λt conveys information on these unanticipated shocks to the household’s optimization
decision process through the saving allocation rule given by equation (4d). According
to (4d), expectations of the future value of the marginal utility of wealth is equal to the
present observed value: households revise their expectations for the next period by taking
into account their forecasting errors realized at t. These forecast errors are assimilated to
unanticipated shocks, having impacts on future expected wages, non-labor income, taste
shifter variables (Dynarski and Sheffrin, 1987). For example, an unexpected decrease
in wages between t − 1 and t leads the household to compute his actualized λt from
anticipated value Et−1[λt] and realized forecast error ∗t . Assuming concave preferences, a
decline in wealth generates a revision of the marginal utility upwards for future period t+
1. In return, this impacts positively the labor supply of married women. The magnitude
of the positive effect depends on the expected consequences in terms of future income
flows, and the probability that the household had anticipated this shock. The higher the
expected consequences and the lower the perceived probability of the negative shock, the
higher the resulting AWE.
We have described the mechanisms underlying the theoretical AWE. In what follows,
we detail our empirical strategy, in accordance with the theoretical implications of the
model.
2 Estimation strategy
In order to measure the causal effect of a household head’s evolution in labor market
outcomes on his partner’s labor supply, this paper relies on panel data and develops an
instrumental variable strategy.
There are at least three reasons why panel data is preferable to a repeated cross
section for the sake of our analysis. First, empirical models based on the standard Min-
cer equation have no behavioral interpretation in a life-cycle framework. Indeed, when
regressing hours worked on the hourly wage, the estimated coefficient captures the re-
sponse of labor supply to wage changes along three directions: wage changes arising from
movements along a wage profile, shifts in a wage profile, and changes in the profile of the
slope (MaCurdy, 1981). From the theoretical discussion in Section 1, it should be clear
that the use of panel data is an absolute requirement to capture the AWE. Indeed, since
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the marginal utility of wealth λt – a key theoretical component – is household-specific
and unobserved, it should be taken into account and differentiated out (Blundell and
Macurdy, 1999). In addition, with labor market conditions deteriorating over the period,
probabilities of being employed are likely to fall for spouses with non-employed partners
as well, even if they produce an extra effort to find or keep a job. Finally, the pool of
households with unemployed heads is likely to differ strongly according to whether the
economy is booming or in the midst of a deep recession. A repeated cross section would
compare households that differ with respect to unobserved characteristics, and this un-
observed heterogeneity would partly contribute to the measured difference in difference
between a spouse with a non-employed partner and an observationally identical spouse
with an employed partner (Starr, 2013).
From the discussion above, unlike estimations relying on cross-sectional data, fixed
effect estimations allow to measure the correlation in labor supply decisions within the
household, abstracting from spurious correlations due to unobserved differences between
households. This being said, in our case, the estimated correlation is not necessarily
causal. The negative correlation between job loss of husbands and their spouse’s activity
is certainly at least partly driven by behavioral decisions. Such a negative correlation
arises whenever the leisure time of spouses are substitute to one another, which would
correspond to the cross wage effects described in Section 1. The job loss of the household
head is not necessarily perceived as a negative income shock exogenously affecting his
spouse’s participation. Unemployment can be seasonal, or correspond to a quit. In this
case, no shock coping mechanism is to be expected from the spouse, since unemployment is
part of the household welfare optimization. In addition, since expectations and perceived
probabilities are the key ingredients of the theoretical mechanism described in Section 1,
our empirical strategy should allow to disentangle the ex ante insurance mechanism from
the ex post coping strategy corresponding to the AWE.
For these reasons, our identification relies on an exogenous (unanticipated) source
of variation in the labor market outcomes of the heads of household. In what follows, we
present our IV strategy.7 In equation (5), Wit is our variable of interest and stands for
7Other strategies have been used to isolate the AWE related to unexpected shocks from behavioral
motives. In particular, involuntary unemployment, and specifically plant closure events, has been used
to circumvent the endogeneity issue (Stephens, 2002). Nonetheless, this estimation strategy necessarily
restricts to the private sector, which reduces the external validity of the results with respect to the
whole population. In addition, during the Argentine crisis, negative income shocks mainly happened
through declines in nominal and real wages, and not uniquely through unemployment (McKenzie, 2004).
Accounting for exogenous shocks in unemployment would tell only one half of the story, leaving aside
decreases in wages.
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the labor market outcome of the head of household i. Yit is the labor market decision
of his spouse. µi is the unobserved fixed effect that may be correlated with levels of
Wit, φt is a time fixed effect, it represents a time varying idiosyncratic error. Xit is a
matrix containing information on time-varying household characteristics and partners’
characteristics.
Yit = Xitβ + Wˆitγ + µi + φt + it
Wit = Xitβ
′ + Zitα + µ′i + φ
′
t + 
′
it
(5)
Since Wit is endogenous, it is instrumented by Zit. The IV Zit relies on a typical
natural experiment framework and exploits variation in time and across economic sec-
tors. According to their sector of occupation, the labor outcomes of the household heads
are asymmetrically affected by the sudden, unexpected end of the Convertibility era in
December 2001.
Figure 1 conveys the intuition behind the instrument Zit. It displays the growth
rates at a sectoral level between 1991 and 2005.
Figure 1 – GDP yearly growth rate 1992-2005, by primary/goods and service sectors
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The 2002 deep recession clearly contrasts with the growth period of 1992-1998,
and even with the mild recession happening in 1999-2000, usual in a volatile emerging
economy. Indeed, during the post-Convertibility crisis, the sectoral asymmetry in growth
rates is large, and exacerbated with respect to the growth and mild recession periods.
Certainly, during the growth period before 1999, asymmetries are to be noted, however
the volatility is general and rather erratic – especially before 1995. During the mild
recession years (1999-2001), growth rates are still either around 0 for all tertiary sectors,
or concentrated in a -10/+10 bandwidth for secondary sectors. In contrast, after the
outburst of the crisis in December 2001, the recession rates differ greatly between sectors:
-30 percent for the construction sector, -20 percent for the banking sector against 0
percent growth for mining and -5 for the real estate sector in 2002.
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For robustness purposes, we construct three different versions of the instrument.
All the defined instruments exploit the variation in time as well as the asymmetry be-
tween exposed and preserved economic sectors, and control whether the household head
changed sector within the observation window. Each set of instruments thus contains
three variables: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation was collected after De-
cember 2001, a variable measuring the sector exposure, and an interaction term between
these two variables. The sets of instruments differ with the measure of ‘exposure’. In
addition, whereas the first two instrument sets rely on EPH data, the last instrument
is constructed using information on the log sectoral GDP provided by the Argentine
statistical agency INDEC.
To define the first two instrument variables sets, we first regress the labor income
of the household head Wit on a dummy variable Sit standing for the post Convertibility
period. We use a panel estimator with individual fixed effects. Then, the same estimation
is run separately for each of the 22 economic sectors s, as seen in equation (6).
Wit = a0 + a1Sit + cis + uit
Wits = a0s + a1sSit + cis + uits
(6)
The coefficient a1s is a measure of sectoral exposure.
8 We define a sector s as
exposed if household heads employed in this sector experience a negative and significant
degradation in Wit between 2001 and 2002 (a1s significant and negative), and if sector s
suffers relatively more than other sectors (i.e., a1s ≥ a1). For the first set of instruments
(IV1 ), the asymmetric shock is the interaction between the exposure dummy and the
post Convertibility time dummy. The second instrumental variable set (IV2 ) relies on
the intensity of the economic shock. It relaxes the rigidity of this asymmetry, and uses
directly a1s instead of the 0/1 dichotomy. In this case, the exposure dummy still defines
whether the sector is a later to be exposed or protected one, and the interaction between
a1s and the post Convertibility time dummy stands for the negative asymmetric shock.
Finally, a third instrument set (IV3 ) is generated using sectoral GDP data between 2000
and 2002. The information is less disaggregated, and relies on 13 sectors of activity
instead of the 22 sectors of the EPH. The set IV3 thus contains: the log GDP of the 13
sectors, the post Convertibility dummy, and the interaction between the two. Estimates
for specification (6) and IV definitions are presented in Appendix. The top panel of
Table 14 gives results for primary and secondary sectors, and the top panel of Table 15
displays results for service sectors. Definitions of the sets IV1 and IV2 are reported in
8Alternatively, equation (6) can be estimated defining Wit as the household head’s unemployment
instead of his labor income. Results are very similar, thus not reported here.
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bottom panels of Tables 14 and 15. GDP data used for IV3 are plotted in Figure 1.
The validity of the estimation design presented in (5) is conditioned on several
assumptions: (i) As usual in an instrumental variable approach, the exclusion restriction
must hold: the asymmetrical change in labor market outcomes of the household head
has no direct influence on the labor supply decision of his spouse, except through the
endogenous regressor instrumented: cov(Zit, it = 0). Additionally, the instrument should
not be too weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, because IV estimators
perform poorly when instruments are weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). (ii) As common
in linear probability models with individual fixed-effects, the empirical strategy exposed
above is valid if the common trend assumption holds. The shock should be exogenous:
there should be no anticipation due to superior information, no biased attrition, nor
group manipulation, i.e. individuals shifting sectors. In addition, there should be no
time-varying unobserved variable that can affect both the interest and outcome variables.
Under these assumptions, the IV procedure enables to capture the causal effect of Wit
on Yit. Additionally, it corrects for the attenuation bias resulting from measuring error
in the labor income of the household head Wit.
To our view, the asymmetrical sectoral shock is a good instrument, primarily be-
cause it has no direct influence on the labor supply decision of his spouse, but is strongly
correlated to the labor outcomes of the household head. Indeed, on the subsample of
women participating on the labor market before 2001, the wife’s sector correlates poorly
with her husband’s. We may think that women’s skills are more prone to be valued in the
relatively protected sectors. For this reason, we account for the evolution in labor market
opportunities for female, to capture labor supply effects related with the evolution in the
economic environment, but disconnected from personal household situations. We do so
by computing a wave-region-age-education hourly wage relative to the wage rate faced
by males with similar characteristics, and introducing it into Xit in (5).
9
For the purpose of instrumentation, the fact that the end of the Convertibility was
widely unexpected is an additional important feature of the negative shock conforting
our identification strategy. Here, some elements of context are required to support the
view that the shock was indeed unexpected by married women, i.e. exogenous to married
women participation. As the best pupil of the Washington Consensus, Argentina was
repeatedly backed by the IMF throughout the 1990s. The situation suddenly escalated
after November 2001, when the IMF decided to cut its financial support, thus deceiving
the optimistic anticipations based on the currency board. The deep degradation in Ar-
9The second panel of Table 2 (Section 3) suggest that if anything, labor market opportunities of
women relatively to men are worsening during the period.
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gentine economic indicators took economists by surprise. In October and November 2001,
most predictions were optimistically announcing a zero growth or a moderate recession
(McKenzie, 2004).10 In this context, the collapse of the currency board change regime
is likely to have been largely unanticipated by Argentine households. Under this exo-
geneity assumption, the pre-crisis labour market participation decisions were not related
to the imminence of a deep crisis. On the other hand, post-crisis adjustments in labor
market participation can legitimately be interpreted as strategical responses to this new
information.
From the discussion above, the orthogonality of the sector of spouses, as well as
the sudden collapse of the currency board change regime, give credit to the exogeneity
assumption. However, the other assumptions do not necessarily hold for a series of
reasons. Possible threats to the validity of our estimation strategy are threefold: panel
attrition, timing or group manipulation (i.e. individuals anticipating the events to come
or shifting sectors strategically), and time varying confounders.
Specifically, one possible candidate for confoundedness is the poverty alleviation
program Jefes y jefas de hogar (herafter JJH) extended in 2002, which could play the
role of a time varying confounder and bias the estimation results. The JJH program
was introduced in January 2001 as an extension to the Trabajar I (1993) and Trabajar
II (1996) workfare programs. Eligible to the program are unemployed household heads
with at least one child under 18. Though the program is universal, 20 weekly working
hours are required as a counterpart for the 150 AR$, in order to target the poorest
households, whose members have a lower reservation wage. Following the end of the
Convertibility era, the program had been largely extended from April 2002 onwards. In
theory, this program simply relaxes the constraint on labor demand by offering low paid
activities under the market wage rate. In practice, the rapid extension of the program
casts doubts on the enforcement or the work requirement. This workfare program is a
potential source of estimate bias for two reasons. First, institutions had no possibility
to know who was the head of the household, which drove women into soliciting this
complementary income while husbands were searching for work – or were involved in
informal activities (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004). This creates a spurious correlation
between a husband unemployment and his spouse’s participation decision. Second, the
program allocation decision is highly decentralized and distributed according to a ‘first
10For example, in the December 2001 World Economic Outlook, the IMF predicted a 1.1 percent
decline in GDP coupled with 0.5% deflation for 2002. These forecasts evolved rapidly in response to
December 2001 events. McKenzie (2004) reports that the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report
issued in January 2002 drastically revised its GDP forecast from -1% to -7% and its inflation predictions
from -0.6% to a 12.7% increase in consumer price index.
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come, first served’ basis with high level of clientelism through syndicates and piqueteros
associations (associations of unemployed individuals protesting and blocking roads to
defend their right to jobs and social protection). Indeed, observers in randomly picked
localities reported a strong heterogeneity in levels of control for compliance with working
hours counterpart. This windfall effect is likely to bias the measured added worker effect
upwards, because the women benefiting from moral hazard or local acquaintances would
otherwise not have been seeking a job.
Besides the intuitions exposed here, Section 5 formally tests the robustness of the
results. We first check the sensitivity of the results to the workfare program JJH: possible
windfall effects of the program are accounted for using a restrictive, conservative definition
of female participation. We then test the common trend hypothesis with the help of a
Placebo test arbitrarily defining the outburst of the crisis in October 2001. The attrition
bias is tested with a series of mean tests across survey waves. Finally, we check to
what extent the results are robust to the existence of superior information – households
anticipating the negative shock – or group manipulation – individuals shifting sectors
strategically between October 2001 and May 2002.
3 Data
The data for this study comes from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, hereafter EPH.
The EPH is collected by Argentina’s National Statistical Agency (Instituto Nacional de
Estadisticas y Censos, herafter INDEC) in May and October of each year in 28 main
urban areas. The survey is a rotating panel: each household is followed during at most 18
months (four waves), then rotated out. Each wave contains information on employment,
as well as demographic, economic, and social characteristics of roughly 90 000 individuals
in 30 000 households. Non-response represents roughly 20% of the available information.
Like most extensive household surveys, the survey uses a geographical criteria, and follows
household dwellings, rather than specific groups of individuals. Households moving to
another area are not followed. To avoid mismatching, the spouse’s age cannot differ by
more than one year from one wave to the next (McKenzie, 2004).
To investigate how the labor market outcomes of spouses are affected by dynamics at
work within the household, we extract information on couples with working age spouses
(women aged 16-60 and males aged 18-65) from the May 2000 wave to the October
2002 wave.11 Married women receiving pension and perceiving unemployment benefits
11The legal age for marriage is 16 for women and 18 for men. In 2001, children can theoretically work
from the age of 14 ; however, children aged 14 to 16 are allowed to work up to 3 hours daily and 15
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represent respectively 2.54% and 0.15% of the whole sample of married women of working
age. Because their participation decision is endogenous to these income sources, and in
so far they represent an extremely small group, corresponding observations are dropped.
Households whose head is retired or student are also excluded from the sample. Finally,
the panel is restricted to households that are observed at least once before and after
the end of the convertibility period. The final sample contains 15 577 observations on
working age couples with an active head between May 2000 and October 2002.12
In the data, the negative income shock experienced by household heads is defined as
a decline in real monthly labor income, or alternatively as a job loss. Married women can
respond to this negative shock experienced by their husband by supplying work at the
extensive margin or at the intensive margin. As for the extensive margin, participation
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spouse is currently employed or declare to be
actively looking for an occupation. Occupation is a dummy standing for employment
only, unemployed labor market participants being redefined as 0. A dummy for full
time employment signals whether the spouse is currently employed and works at least
21 weekly hours. This leads almost half of the program beneficiaries to be redefined
as inactive. These measures of labor supply are completed by taking into account the
workfare program Jefes y jefas de hogar. As explained in Section 2, the implementation of
the program may have created windfall effects, biasing the results upwards. To account
for this possibility, we generate a stricter version of the participation and occupation
dummies, where beneficiaries of the workfare program are assigned a 0 instead of a 1,
unless they work strictly more than the minimum legal amount of hours, or declare
working the legal number of hours and wishing to work more hours.13 Finally, at the
intensive margin, this paper concentrates on two labor supply measures: actual weekly
working hours, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spouse expresses the willingness
to work more hours. The sample is restricted to married women who declare working a
strictly positive amount of hours during the period.14
All specifications in this paper are estimated using a panel data model with individ-
hours a week during the morning or afternoon, as long as the work is within a family business, is not
hazardous, and does not interrupt schooling. Between 1994-2002, an ongoing pension reform gradually
changed the pension age for men and women. The retirement age is 62 for men and 57 for women in
1994, 63/58 in 1996, 64/59 in 1998, and 65/60 since 2001. In this study, the working age for women is
defined following the 2001 legislation.
12The main analysis is based on this sample. The robustness checks typically use a larger sample going
back to the May 1998 wave.
13Additional robustness checks are conducted in Section 5.
14We do not model the sample selection, in so far it requires a convincing exclusion restriction. Results
have to be interpreted accordingly.
17
ual fixed effects. Serial correlation is accounted for by clustering the standard errors at
the household level. All individual fixed effects are thus differentiated out in the within
estimation procedure. However, time varying variables have to be accounted for in case
they influence married women participation into the workforce.
Having additional children is a first time varying variable potentially influencing
married women participation decisions. For this reason, we control for the variation in
the number of pre-schooling children, children in compulsory schooling age, and children
in working age. Another important time-varying variable is the availability of alternative
shock coping strategies. There is no reason why households should pick up one strategy
over the available set. As detailed by Frankenberg et al. (2003) in the 1997 Indonesian
crisis case, households usually diversify their coping strategies to mitigate the negative
effects of a shock on their well being. For this reason, and within the limits of available
data, we control for alternative coping strategies using information on sources of non-
labor income: labor income coming from other household members, and a series of non
labor income sources proxying for adjustment strategies (fluctuation in capital income)
or network strategies (fluctuation in remittances from non-members).
Another reason for married women participation to rise could be that their op-
portunities on the labor market increase in absolute terms, or relatively to their male
counterpart. This could be the case if the sectoral composition changes towards services.
To control for this eventuality, we compute the mean unemployment rate and hourly
wage rate faced by female workers at each wave-region-age-education level15, and include
them into the regression. Furthermore, we include the ratio of hourly female wage rate
on hourly male wage rate, calculated at the wave-region-age-education level as well, to
account for an evolution in relative hourly wages.
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on means for outcome, interest, control
and demographic variables.16 Table 1 gives information on married women labor market
decision and husbands’ outcomes. As mentioned above, simple descriptive statistics are
not supportive of an added worker effect. Women participation increased from 48.47
to 49.42 percent between 2000 and 2002, however, this difference is not statistically
significant. In case JJH beneficiaries who do not declare working 20 hours weekly nor
actively seeking to work more hours are redefined as inactive, the participation even tends
to decline. The same evolution is observed at the intensive margin: conditional on being
occupied during the convertibility period, married women work on average 5 hours less in
15There are 6 regions, 3 age categories (16-29, 30-44, 45-59) and 3 educational levels (primary or less,
secondary, superior education)
16Means of time constant variables are actually not constant between 2000-2001 and 2002 because
households can be observed twice before or after the currency board collapsed.
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Table 1 – Summary statistics: labor market outcomes
of both spouses
Mean before and after Convertibility
Before After Mean test
Labor market outcomes, female
Participationa (%) 48.47 49.42 0.197
Participationb (%) 47.94 46.89 0.151
Unemployed (%) 5.06 5.87 0.016**
Occupation (%) 43.41 43.55 0.845
Full timec (%) 31.20 29.52 0.013**
Self-employed (%) 7.93 7.10 0.032**
Workfare program JJH (%) 1.70 4.62 0.000***
Hours worked 29.44 25.62 0.000***
Add. hours suppliedd (%) 33.18 27.81 0.000***
Labor market outcomes, male
Participationb (%) 99.81 99.26 0.000***
Unemployed 10.04 14.37 0.000***
Occupation 89.96 85.63 0.000***
Full time c (%) 81.80 75.57 0.000***
Self-employed (%) 8.77 7.84 0.022**
Workfare program JJH (%) 1.43 2.56 0.000***
Hours worked 41.68 37.30 0.000***
Add. hours supplied d (%) 37.77 36.44 0.196
Notes: Statistics on the 2000-2002 EPH sample of working age couples
with active household head and being observed at least once before and
after the currency board breakdown. P-values of differences, * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a Participation is 1 if individual is employed
or declare actively looking for a job. b Participation rate excluding work-
fare program beneficiaries who do not declare looking for more hours or
an other occupation. c Full employment is working strictly more than 20
hours. d Additional hours supplied is 1 if individual is employed and de-
clares willing to work more hours.
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Table 2 – Summary statistics: income and household
characteristics
Mean before and after Convertibility
Before After Mean test
Income
Husband monthly wage 642.70 437.80 0.000***
Wife monthly wage 219.74 154.99 0.000***
Monthly wage, other 76.76 51.49 0.000***
Pension 9.17 7.62 0.078*
Capital 5.34 2.56 0.003***
Unemployment benefits 3.99 3.69 0.742
Remittances 3.11 2.16 0.014**
Other 12.85 8.10 0.040**
Non-labor income 34.45 24.13 0.000***
Macroeconomic opportunities, female
Mean unemployment 15.52 16.39 0.000***
Mean hourly wage 3.20 2.35 0.000***
Relative hourly wage 0.64 0.63 0.000***
Demographics, female
Age (in years) 38.13 38.93 0.000***
Primary or less (%) 38.63 39.45 0.255
Secondary (%) 39.18 39.07 0.876
Superior (%) 22.19 21.49 0.246
Demographics, male
Age 40.89 41.70 0.000***
Primary or less (%) 41.23 41.89 0.357
Secondary (%) 40.32 40.16 0.817
Superior (%) 18.45 17.95 0.378
Demographics, household
Gran Buenos Aires 15.47 12.70 0.000***
North-West 20.33 20.62 0.632
North-East 12.01 12.65 0.185
Cuyo 11.31 12.07 0.106
Pampa 26.47 26.88 0.532
Patagonia 14.40 15.09 0.187
Household members
Nb child 0-5 0.66 0.64 0.068*
Nb child 6-13 0.95 0.96 0.438
Nb child 14-17 0.39 0.41 0.046**
Nb older dependent 0.05 0.05 0.669
Notes: See Table 1. All information on income is expressed in May 1998 pesos.
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2002 than in 2000-2001. Additionally, they do not show signs of willingness to work extra
hours: on the opposite, the proportion of women willing to work more hours actually
decreases significantly. This was to be expected because unemployment is rising between
the pre and the post convertibility periods: labor supply mechanically decreases at the
intensive margin, as part of the formerly employed married women now supply labor at
the extensive margin again. As expected, the number of workfare program beneficiaries
increases together with its extension decided in April 2002, and concerns 4% of married
women in 2002.
Table 2 conveys information on other time-varying variables detailed above. Un-
surprisingly, all types of non labor income decreased, except unemployment benefits.17
Part of this decline is related to the 30 percent inflation following the peso devaluation;
the rest is either nominal decrease, or asset selling in the case of capital income.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Baseline estimation: fixed effect results
As a preliminary analysis, we generate baseline estimates from a simple linear probability
model with fixed-effects, in line with most of the existing empirical studies:
Yit = Xitβ +Witγ + µi + φt + it (7)
where Wit stands for the labor market outcomes of the household head at time
t (alternatively the labor earnings of the employment status), Yit represents the labor
supplied by his spouse, µi is the unobserved fixed effect that may be correlated with levels
of Wit, φt is a time fixed effect, it represents a time varying idiosyncratic error, and Xit is
a matrix containing time-varying household characteristics and partners’ characteristics.
Results of specification (7) are displayed in Table 3. A 30 percent decrease in the
labor income of the household head (which is the mean evolution in household head labor
income over the period) is associated with a 0.51 percentage point increase in his spouse’s
probability to enter the labor market (column 1).18 Going back to Table 1, this represents
half of the variation in female labor supply over the period. Turning to unemployment, it
17As mentioned above, households with wife cashing in unemployment benefits are dropped out of the
sample for endogeneity issues. Unemployment benefits still concern 1.11 percent of the sample. In 86.6
percent of the cases, unemployment benefits belong to the household head.
18The fact that this effect could be driven by women withdrawing from the labor market when their
husband reenters employment or get a better paycheck is a legitimate concern. To rule out this possibility,
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appears that a married woman is 7.3 percentage points more likely to enter the workforce
if her husband looses his job. Since the unemployment probability for married men rises
by 4.3 percentage points, this overall unemployment is related to a 0.3 percentage point
increase in female participation. Accounting for potential windfall effects generated by the
introduction of the workfare program does not dramatically change the results (column
2). As it was to be expected in such a depressed context, the added participants do
not all find a job. Still, employment represents more than two third of the additional
workforce (column 3) related to husband’s losses in labor income or employment, half of
which translating into full-time employment (column 5).
Finally, conditional on being employed, married women do wish to work more hours
in case their husband experiences a negative shock on the labor market. The overall
decline in income is related to a 0.3 percentage points increase in their probability to
declare wanting additional working hours (column 6). However, at the intensive margin,
this extra labor supply does not translate into more actual working hours (column 7).19
4.2 IV estimation results
we run the same estimations on the subsample of wives entering the labor force after the end of the
Convertibility. As expected, using specification (7), the negative effect of the household head income
on participation holds. This means that the effect is not driven by women withdrawing from the labor
force. The size of the IV estimates more than doubles, and the precision increases.
19For the sake of completeness, we run a symmetric regression analysis with husbands’ labor market
outcomes as a dependent variable, explained by changes in their spouse’s income or employment status.
Since we concentrate on active women, the sample size shrinks down to half. Coefficients of interest are
of expected sign, but of a much smaller magnitude, and not significantly different from 0.
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Table 3 – Female labor market participation and their spouse labor market outcomes
– Linear probability results
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full-time Wish more hours Hours worked
Household head
monthly wage
−0.017*** −0.013*** −0.013*** −0.009*** −0.004* −0.010** −0.059
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.097)
Household head
unemployment
0.073*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.017* 0.069*** 0.421
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.024) (0.573)
Observations 18755 18755 18755 18755 18755 7944 7944
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
+Restrictive definition of participation and occupation: excludes JJH workfare program participants, unless they de-
clare working strictly more than the legal amount, or 20 hours and wishing to work more hours.
Estimates from linear-probability regressions with individual fixed effects. The following time-varying variables are
included into the estimation: macroeconomic opportunities for female suppliers (mean unemployment rate at year-
region-age level, log mean hourly wage rate at year-region-age level, relative hourly wage rate with respect to male
counterparts at year-region-age level), household composition (number of children under schooling age, number of
children at compulsory schooling age, number of children in working age and under 18, number of third generation
parents), alternative sources of income (other labor income, pension, capital income, unemployment indemnities, re-
mittances, other), and time fixed effects for each observation wave.
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Following the empirical strategy defined in Section 2, equation (5) is estimated using
instrumental variables Zit. Control variables Xit are similar to the variables presented
for the preliminary analysis above.20
Table 4 reports the first stage (left hand side panel) and reduced form results (right
hand side panel). Looking at the first stage, the coefficients are strongly significant, and
of the expected sign: husbands working in exposed sectors experience a higher decrease in
labor income, and a higher probability to lose their job than the other household heads.
Correspondingly, the F-stat are all above 10, ruling out the issue of weak instruments. On
the whole, the first stage results suggest that the chosen variables qualify for instrumen-
tation. Considering the reduced form, the exposure to the shock is a good explanatory
variable for the variation in married women participation. For example, looking at the
instrument set IV1, the fact that a husband is working in an exposed sector makes a
wife 4.6 percentage points more likely to enter the labor market after 2001. Note that on
the opposite, the IV sets correlate poorly with the intensive margin measures of female
participation.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the estimation of equation (5), using the three
sets of instrumental variable and instrumenting for two variables of interest, namely the
labor earnings of the household head (Table 5) and his unemployment status (Table 6).
Results displayed in Table 5 are consistent across all specifications of the instru-
ments. We first look at participation at the extensive margin. A 1 percentage point
decrease in husband unemployment generates a 0.14 percentage point increase in female
labor market participation (column 1). Considering that the household head real wage
decreased by 32% between 2000 and 2002 (see Table 2), this implies that the AWE gen-
erated a 4.4 percentage point increase in female participation. This is clearly superior to
the 1 percentage point increase observed at the aggregate level, meaning that the AWE
is indeed offset by an important discouraged worker effect. After taking into account
the possible windfall effect generated by the JJH workfare program, the AWE is slightly
smaller, and looses some statistical significance (column 2). However, it still accounts
for 1.92 to 2.24 percentage point increase in the labor market participation of married
women over the period.
Does this AWE translate into more employment for married women whose husband
20Only time fixed effects are accounted for differently. Indeed, time already appears within the instru-
mentation procedure through a pre/post convertibility dummy variable, because the identification relies
on sectoral differences before and after the collapse of convertibility. A complete set of semestrial time
fixed effects is collinear to the pre/post dummy. Within each of the pre and post periods, time fixed
effects are accounted for. Reference categories are October 2001 for the pre period, and October 2002
for the post period.
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Table 5 – Female labor market participation and their spouse’s labor income – IV results
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full Wish more hours Hours worked
IV1
Household head
monthly wage
−0.142*** −0.071*** −0.110*** −0.038** −0.032* −0.013 1.495
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.915)
IV2
Household head
monthly wage
−0.135*** −0.062*** −0.110*** −0.037** −0.025 −0.040 1.676*
(0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.034) (0.884)
IV3
Household head
monthly wage
−0.195*** −0.068** −0.149*** −0.022 −0.054* −0.005 1.307
(0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.056) (1.469)
Observations 18755 18755 18755 18755 18755 7039 7039
Notes: See Table 3 and Table 4. Estimates from linear-probability instrumental regressions with individual fixed effects.
lost labor income with the outburst of the 2001 economic crisis? Occupation (column
3) does indeed increase significantly: a spouse whose husband experienced a 1 percent
decrease in his labor income is 0.11 percentage points more likely to actually work at
least one hour. The effect shrinks down to 0.04 if we follow the strictest definition of
participation and exclude JJH beneficiaries as described above (column 4). Even so, the
coefficient remains higher than the baseline specification of Table 3. Looking at IV1 and
IV3, in one third of the cases, the increase in participation results in full time employment
(column 5).
Turning to Table 6, similar effects are found when looking at the causal impact of
the household head’s job loss on the participation of his spouse. A married woman with
unemployed husband is 32 to 43 percentage points more likely to enter the labor market
if her husband becomes unemployed. Within this period, unemployment increased by
4.3 percentage points (column 1), implying that unemployment generated a 1.38 to 1.85
percentage point increase in married women participation overall. When windfall effects
of the JJH workfare program are singled out (column 2), the AWE decreases by one third
and IV3 coefficients become insignificant. However, considering IV1 and IV2, the AWE
mechanism generates a 1 to 1.25 percentage point increase in female participation. Note
that unlike decreases in income, the household head’s job loss has no significant positive
effect on the probability to work full time for his wife (column 5).
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Table 6 – Female labor market participation and their spouse’s employment status – IV
results
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full Wish more hours Hours worked
IV1
Household head
unemployment
0.433*** 0.289** 0.353*** 0.209* 0.069 0.287 −6.158
(0.124) (0.118) (0.116) (0.109) (0.097) (0.218) (5.441)
IV2
Household head
unemployment
0.429*** 0.242** 0.379*** 0.192** 0.048 0.406* −7.631
(0.110) (0.103) (0.103) (0.095) (0.085) (0.209) (5.219)
IV3
Household head
unemployment
0.328* 0.124 0.306* 0.102 0.113 0.726** −11.008
(0.174) (0.168) (0.164) (0.155) (0.143) (0.363) (8.648)
Observations 18755 18755 18755 18755 18755 7039 7039
Notes: See Table 3 and Table 4. Estimates from linear-probability instrumental regressions with individual fixed effects.
Both Table 5 and Table 6 also display estimates for spouses’ labor supply at the
intensive margin (column 6 and 7). Here, the sample is reduced to households with an
employed spouse in both periods. Compared with the extensive margin, results are less
robust across the various specifications. Looking at column 6 of Table 6, an interesting
robust causal relation appears between the job loss of the household head and his spouse’s
desire to work more hours. Indeed, with respect to women whose husband does not change
situation, they are twice more likely to declare wishing to work more hours. Interestingly,
looking back at Table 5, no such relation appears when husbands experience a decrease
in income, suggesting that this additional supply of working hours is driven by leisure
substitution between spouses. However, this additional supply of hours does not evolve
into an actual increase in working hours (column 7). In fact, if anything, the relation
goes counter the AWE hypothesis. Indeed, looking back at Table 5, only women whose
husband experiences a positive labor income shock are actually likely to work more hours.
This suggests that the capacity to keep a job and extend working hours is not randomly
assigned with respect to household characteristics. Overall, the results obtained with the
IV method in Tables 5 and 6 are higher in magnitude than the results obtained with the
simple fixed effect model in Table 3.
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4.3 Some evidence on compensation effects
To what extent does the labor income shock experienced by the household head affect
the total household income? To what extent does the added worker effect compensate
for this loss?
We provide some suggestive evidence using the specification in equation (8). We
reason at the intra-household level, and we focus on the correlation between variations in
the labor income of the household head Wit, and other income sources Iit. St is a dummy
variable standing for the post crisis period, Wit × St is an interaction term capturing
specific post crisis correlations between the income of the household head and the other
income sources. µi is an individual fixed effect, and φt is a time fixed effect.
Iit = Witβ + Stγ +Wit × Stδ + µi + φt + it (8)
In Table 7, we first look at the correlation between the variation of the household
head’s labor income, and the total monthly family income (column 1). A 1 percent
decrease in the household head labor income is associated with a 0.37 percent decrease
in the total family income. This coefficient is significantly lower than 1, implying that
variations in the income of the household head are at least partially compensated by
variations in other income sources.
Next, we focus on the correlation between variations in the labor income of the
household head, and variations in other income sources (column 2-8). Clearly, non-labor
income is the most sensitive to the variations in the labor income of the household head.
A 1 percent income loss is associated with a 0.18 percent increase in the non labor income
of a family (column 2). The labor income of other members of the household is far less
responsive. If anything, the labor income of other members (spouse excepted) correlates
positively with the labor income of the household head (column 3).
Nonetheless, the variation in labor income of the spouse reveals interesting patterns.
First of all, the variation in the labor income of married women is negatively correlated
with the labor income of her spouse (column 4). Interestingly, adding the interaction term
Wit×St indicates that the negative correlation exclusively relates to the post 2002 period
(column 5), while this was not the case for other income sources. Column 6 suggests
that the compensation is stronger whenever the sample is restricted to spouses whose
husband experienced a decline in labor income over the period 2000-2002: the correlation
appears not to be driven by married women withdrawing from the labor market when
their husband finds a job. Unsurprisingly, the correlation is even more negative when
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Table 7 – Alternative income sources and the labor income of the household head
Family
incomea
Non-labor
incomeb
Labor
incomec
Spouse labor income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Household head
Log mthly inc. (W)
0.365*** −0.183*** 0.020* −0.026** −0.010 0.022 0.043 0.052
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032)
Shock (2002) −0.250*** −0.057 −0.058 −0.190***−0.025 0.148 0.666*** 0.804***
(0.089) (0.098) (0.083) (0.052) (0.096) (0.141) (0.191) (0.199)
Shock × W 0.005 −0.002 0.012 −0.030** −0.060***−0.076***−0.083***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 18755 18755 18755 18755 18755 14429 7864 6171
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. All
specifications include time and individual fixed effects. aFamily income contains all income sources, including
the labor income of the household head and his spouse. bNon labor income includes pensions, capital income,
remittances, and other income sources. cLabor income of all household members, head and spouse excepted.
the sample is restricted to women whose husband experienced a decline in income, and
who are either on the market during the whole period, or entering the labor market after
the 2002 economic shock (column 7). Finally, column 8 considers women who are either
employed during the full period, or entering an occupation after the shock. The point
estimate of 0.08 suggests that when a married woman is/enters on the labor market, and
manages to work at least one hour, almost one tenth of the household head’s income loss
at the time of the crisis is compensated.
5 Robustness analysis
In this section, we first run a sensitivity analysis with respect to the workfare program
JJH. We then perform standard robustness checks to support the validity of our empirical
design. To give additional credit to the common trend hypothesis, we run a placebo re-
gression, arbitrarily redefining the date of the shock in October 2001 instead of December
2001. We then test for attrition across waves. Finally, we provide additional evidence
supporting the exogeneity of the shock with respect to married women participation
decision.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
Within the EPH, JJH beneficiaries are defined as employed. However, the rapid scaling-up
and the institutionally explosive context made it difficult to ensure that beneficiaries were
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complying with the work requirements, which may have fostered shirking. Additionally,
anecdotal claims report clientelism from the part of municipalities and unions in the
granting process. If this is the case, the JJH program plays the role of a time confounder
in the causal estimation of the AWE.
This issue should not be too preoccupying. Indeed, in their evaluation of the JJH
program, Galasso and Ravallion (2004) insist on the essential role of the program in alle-
viating poverty and reducing unemployment: more than the half of the JJH participants
were originally unemployed, meaning that the windfall effect does not exceed 50 percent
of the JJH beneficiaries. Still, we adopt two strategies to disentangle the windfall effect of
the program from the measured AWE. First, we use available information in the EPH to
redefine as inactive JJH participants that would most likely not seek for a job. Second, we
concentrate on relevant subsamples, and show that the AWE also appears in subgroups
where the JJH program was not available or requested.
We first redefine JJH beneficiaries as inactive, unless they declared actively looking
for a job at least once in the year prior to their participation in the JJH program partic-
ipation. Of course, such a piece of information is not available for all married women in
the panel, so this definition is overly conservative: only 14.7% of the original JJH bene-
ficiaries qualify to be included into the labor market participating group. Then, taking
into account that the working counterpart was mostly enforced after May 2002 (Galasso
and Ravallion, 2004), we redefine all beneficiaries entering the program before May 2002
as inactive. We argue that these restrictions select out the beneficiaries that are least
likely to comply with the workfare contribution and most likely to shirk and benefit from
a windfall effect. If the moral hazard issues are sorted out, the implementation of the
workfare program comes down to relaxing the constraint over the demand side.
The first two columns of Table 8 present the results for participation decision and
employment probability with respect to husband labor market outcomes, once we restrict
participation and occupation definitions. The AWE is still significant, and represents one
half to two thirds of the estimates displayed in Table 5.
Alternatively, we now measure the AWE by excluding the households where the wife
participates into the JJH program from the sample. The results are presented in Column
3 of Table 8. The AWE is still showing up, and is far from negligible: a 10 percent decrease
in the household head’s labor income generates a 0.64 percentage point increase in the
probability of his spouse to participate into the labor market. This represents 60 percent
of the AWE effect found using the whole sample. However, unlike in the case of Table 5
or 6, this participation does not translate that easily into more employment. In a context
of decreasing opportunities, spouses whose husband experiences an income decline or a
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Table 8 – Sensitivity analysis using restrictive definitions for participation
and occupation
Dep. Var: Participation Dep. Var: Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Household head
monthly wage
−0.056** −0.088*** −0.064** −0.040* −0.072*** −0.035
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
F-stat FS 33.78 33.78 31.57 33.78 33.78 31.57
Household head
unemployment
0.217* 0.322*** 0.245** 0.145 0.249** 0.111
(0.114) (0.120) (0.116) (0.107) (0.111) (0.105)
F-stat FS 45.55 45.55 45.89 45.55 45.55 45.89
Observations 18755 18755 18088 18755 18755 18088
Notes: See Table 3 and Table 4. Specification (1): JJH beneficiaries excluded from participation and occu-
pation, unless they happen to have been unemployed prior to JJH program extension. Specification (2):
JJH beneficiaries excluded from participation and occupation if they entered the program before May 2002.
Instrument set is IV1. IV2 set yields similar results. With IV3, coefficients are of similar magnitude, but
error terms are higher. Specification (3): JJH beneficiaries excluded from participation.
job loss are not more likely to actually find a job than spouses with more stable husbands,
which mean that they enter unemployment without benefiting from the JJH program.
This result gives further evidence in favor of the poverty and unemployment alleviation
role played by the JJH (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004): married women ineligible or unable
to benefit from the JJH express willingness to supply labor, but cannot cope against the
shock affecting their household.
5.2 Placebo test
If the common trend assumption hold, the AWE should not exist before the actual out-
burst of the crisis. We thus perform a placebo test arbitrarily redefining the Convertibility
collapse to happen in October instead of December 2001. Table 9 is generated by running
the exact same instrumental definition and estimation procedures presented in Section 2,
with this new definition of the Convertibility collapse. Within this estimation framework,
we find that variations in the labor outcomes of the household head do not affect female
participation. The top (respectively bottom) panel of Table 9 presents results instru-
menting for the labor income (respectively the occupation status) of the household head.
In both panels, all the displayed coefficients are smaller than the coefficients reported in
Tables 5 and 6. All coefficients (but one) do not significantly differ from 0 at the 10%
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level.
Table 9 – Placebo test: the Convertibility arbitrarily ends before October 2001
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full Wish more hours Hours worked
IV1
Household head
monthly wage
−0.065 −0.063 −0.045 −0.044 0.037 0.034 −0.089
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.084) (2.914)
IV2
Household head
monthly wage
−0.049 −0.043 −0.030 −0.025 0.036 0.005 0.852
(0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.081) (2.958)
IV3
Household head
monthly wage
−0.150 −0.120 −0.146* −0.116 −0.097 0.030 −9.186
(0.091) (0.085) (0.087) (0.080) (0.075) (0.165) (8.818)
Observations 20281 20281 20281 20281 20281 9576 9576
IV1
Household head
unemployment
0.315 0.295 0.198 0.179 −0.169 −0.175 −0.587
(0.200) (0.198) (0.181) (0.177) (0.179) (0.397) (13.744)
IV2
Household head
unemployment
0.243 0.207 0.130 0.093 −0.166 −0.041 −4.806
(0.187) (0.185) (0.168) (0.165) (0.166) (0.381) (13.304)
IV3
Household head
unemployment
0.292 0.226 0.254 0.189 0.126 0.078 3.852
(0.187) (0.184) (0.174) (0.169) (0.159) (0.287) (11.160)
Observations 20281 20281 20281 20281 20281 9576 9576
Notes: See Table 3 and Table 4. Estimates from linear-probability instrumental regressions with individual fixed effects.
5.3 Attrition
As for any panel survey, attrition is of potential concern. Notably, The Argentina statis-
tical intitute INDEC reports some troubles in collecting the data for interviewers in nine
areas of the Greater Buenos Aires after the outburst of the economic and social turmoil of
December 2001. According to their estimations, insecurity on field accounts for 2.2 per-
centage point decrease in GBA sample’s representativeness. Random assignment of these
social troubles is unlikely. Mismatching represents an other concern of attrition bias. As
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mentioned earlier, in its sampling strategy, EPH uses a geographical criteria, following
household structures rather than specific households. As a consequence, mismatching
can lead to an attrition bias, especially if decision to move in or out is determined by
economic environment – which is likely to be the case.
A simple test for panel attrition consists in computing group-means for a range
of outcomes of interest: husband unemployment, husband log income for each year t =
1998, 1999, ...2002 separately. Individuals are grouped according to their stage j (j =
1, 2, 3, 4) in EPH survey. Significant differences in means between these different groups
would give support to the attrition bias hypothesis.
Formally, we use the enlarged sample and test for mean equalities: W 1 = W 2 =
W 3 = W 4: regressing it on j dummies for waves, for each t between 1998 and 2002:
Wi = α +
4∑
j=1
βjwij + i (9)
The constant term α indicates mean outcome for new entrants in survey, and the
coefficients measure deviation to this mean for participants in waves 2, 3, and 4 of the
same year exposed to same economic conditions. Results reported in Table 10 suggest
that panel attrition is limited. Regardless of the year, the household head labor market
outcomes exhibit no pattern of attrition from wave to wave.21
5.4 Superior information
We now provide additional evidence supporting the exogeneity of the negative shock with
respect to the participation decision of married women. In this section, we consider the
fact that households may have accessed superior information, and consequently given
an anticipated response to the shock. As previously stated, the international statistical
agencies did not forecast the depth of the Argentine economic crisis. As an additional
piece of evidence, we re-run the specification (7), but we replace the interest variables
with their forward values. The idea behind this specification is that if the superior
information hypothesis holds, part of the adjustment should happen before the negative
shock actually hits the households.
21Alternatively, we regress the probability for a household to drop out from the sample before the
fourth wave on the labor income, and the employment status of the household head, controlling for time
fixed effects. We find no difference in the probability of dropping out: in the period before they drop
out of the sample, dropouts are not different from non dropouts with respect to key interest variables.
The results (not reported here) are available upon request.
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Table 10 – Mean test for sample attrition analysis
Dep. var.: husb. monthly income Dep. var: husb. unemployment
EPH 2000 EPH 2001 EPH 2002 EPH 2000 EPH 2001 EPH 2002
Second wave participant −0.003 −0.023 −0.095 0.001 0.011 0.014
(0.038) (0.043) (0.061) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Third wave participant −0.043 −0.020 −0.078 0.004 0.006 0.015
(0.038) (0.043) (0.061) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Fourth wave participant −0.021 −0.069 −0.063 0.001 0.010 0.016
(0.040) (0.045) (0.062) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Constant 5.875*** 5.669*** 5.191*** 0.085*** 0.101*** 0.122***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.051) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 16184 15945 12936 16184 15945 12936
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual
level.
Table 11 – Test for superior information
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full-time Wish more hours Hours worked
Household head
monthly wage
0.000 −0.000 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 0.003 −0.057
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.134)
Household head
unemployment
−0.004 −0.000 0.017 0.020 0.015 −0.006 0.311
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.787)
Observations 11971 11971 11971 11971 11971 4965 4965
Notes: See Table 3. Estimates from linear-probability regressions with individual fixed effects.
Table 11 indicates that no correlation exists between the labor supply of a married
woman and the labor market outcomes of her husband observed during the following
semester.22
5.5 Group manipulation
Regarding the exogeneity assumption, a second concern arises with the possibility of
group manipulation: namely, the fact that household heads working in the most exposed
sectors may switch sector to avoid the negative effects of the crisis on their labor out-
22In addition, we re-run the IV specification (5). At the extensive margin, the results (not reported)
are not significantly different from 0.
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comes. Unsurprisingly, household heads do indeed change sector across periods. Overall,
between October 2000 and October 2002, 8.08% of the sample observations report that
the household head switches from a protected towards an exposed sector (3.73%) or vice
versa (4.35%). Though the phenomenon is not massive, whether these changes may be
endogenous to female participation or not is a relevant question. In what follows, we
first provide the intuition behind the possible bias. We then provide empirical evidence
suggesting that a bias related to group manipulation should be ruled out.
Regarding the first stage regression, the existence of a strategic group manipulation
could bias the negative relation between the husband income and the sector’s exposure
towards 0 (in case of a reverse causality, where only the least exposed actually stay in-
volved in their sector of origin). Alternatively, the bias could be of an undetermined sign,
if unobserved characteristics determine both the capacity of a household head to change
sector and his income variation. In any case, the group manipulation is mostly prob-
lematic if these unobserved characteristics simultaneously affect the decision of married
women to supply labor.23 In this case, the sector of the household head is endogenous
to the participation decision of the spouse. Under this hypothesis, the estimates would
be biased. Theoretically, the sign of the bias is unclear, and mainly relates to the degree
of substitution and complementarity existing between the two coping strategies, i.e. the
added worker and the change in sector of activity. The estimates will be biased upward
if the strategies are substitutes (husbands who switch sectors do so because their wives
are unable or unwilling to supply labor). The bias will go in the opposite direction if the
strategies are complements: spouses whose husband switch sector are also more able or
willing to supply labor. The empirical literature on household vulnerability clearly favors
the complementarity argument (Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2004): while some households
benefit from a wide panel of adjustment strategies, others fail to compensate for negative
shocks. For example, in our case, the fact to possess an extended network could enable a
household head to switch sector and simultaneously his wife to supply additional hours
or get a job.
We check the robustness of our results following three intuitions. First, if changing
sector really matters for husbands’ outcomes and female participation, it should already
be enhanced by the first stage and reduced form regressions of Table 4 (Section 4).
Indeed, as explained in Section 2, the instrument sets already include a dummy indicating
whether the sector of activity is a protected or exposed one. In the first stage, the effect
23These unobserved characteristics do not need to vary with time. Although they are time-invariant,
they are not differentiated out with the individual component because their effect itself is time-varying.
These characteristics come into play once the negative shock hits, and can play the role of a time-varying
confounder.
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of a change in sector type on the income of the household head is thus taken into account.
As indicated by the point estimate for the variable Exposed sector in Table 4, on average,
this change has no effect on the income or employment status of the household head. In
addition, the reduced form regressions suggest that there is no correlation between shifts
in sectors and married women participation, even through the channel of their husband’s
labor market outcomes. These results thus convey a first convincing piece of evidence
suggesting that changes in sectors are exogenous to female participation.
Second, we take advantage of the fact that switching sector is a common event for
individuals in normal times as well. We compare the household heads who switch sector
during the 2002 events with those who switch in the previous periods. Our goal is to
see whether the post Convertibility switchers have specific characteristics with respect to
their counterparts in normal times, that would then strategically interact with the added
worker effect. We regress the probability to change sector on a series of individual and
occupation-specific characteristics at baseline: age, education, number of children and
elderly in the household, home-ownership, employment status (owner, self employed, wage
earner), firm size, task qualification, stability of the job. We allow these characteristics to
have a specific effect after October 2001. In line with expectation, the probit results (not
reported here) show that overall, household heads changing sectors tend to be qualified
wage earners with jobs limited on duration at baseline. However, no observed individual
or occupation-specific characteristic allows to distinguish individuals switching sector
with respect to the timing of the Convertibility crisis. This supports our view that the
possibility for household heads to change sector does not come at costs of our exogeneity
assumption.
Finally, as a third robustness check, we take into consideration the extreme hypoth-
esis that the households whose husband switches sector entirely drive the results. We
run the analysis again excluding the switchers from our sample. From Table 12, we see
that the results are robust to the exclusion of the households whose head switches sector
between October 2001 and May 2002.24
24In addition, we re-run the IV specification (5) (not reported here). When we instrument for the
variations in the household head monthly wage, the results are very similar to the main results of
Table 5. When instrumenting for the unemployment status, the magnitude of the point estimates is
higher. In this case, group manipulation may be responsible for a downward bias. This gives credit to
the hypothesis of complementarity between coping strategies.
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Table 12 – Test for group manipulation
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full-time Wish more hours Hours worked
Household head
monthly wage
−0.016*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.007*** −0.003 −0.011** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.110)
Household head
unemployment
0.071*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.029** 0.014 0.058** 0.049
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.027) (0.661)
Observations 17239 17239 17239 17239 17239 7300 7300
Notes: See Table 3. Estimates from linear-probability regressions with individual fixed effects.
6 Heterogeneity analysis
This section provides an insight into heterogeneous effects at work beyond the average
AWE. Several assumptions can be made regarding the relevant sources of heterogeneity.
First, in a traditional labor supply perspective, women in childless couples should have
a preference for working, or should be less constrained in their labor supply decisions.
As a consequence, their AWE should exceed the AWE for women with children. On the
other hand, according to a more collective view of the household (Lundberg et al., 1997),
all else being equal, and controlling for the variation in the number of children within
the household, women with children could enter relatively more the labor market if their
husband experiences a decline in income, in order to smooth their children’s consumption.
Second, the AWE should be negatively correlated with the holding of assets. Though
information on savings is not available within this survey, the life cycle theory suggests
that individuals smooth their consumption over their lifetime, implying that savings are
formed in an intermediate phase of the life cycle. The AWE is expected to vary according
to the age category of the household (Starr, 2013). Third, income utility marginally
decreases. Correspondingly, the wealth effect associated with a given temporary income
loss should be higher if the household belongs to the first income quartile at baseline,
than in case it pertains to the richest quartile (MaCurdy, 1985). Following this idea, the
AWE should be smaller in case the household owns its dwelling. Finally, all else being
equal, the AWE should be related to the level of human capital accumulated by married
women. On the one hand, the AWE should be higher when wives are more educated,
because educated wives should be prone to work and find better opportunities. On the
other hand, their participation level is already high relatively to the less educated women,
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and their reservation wage is higher, which is a barrier to entry on the informal labor
market.
In order to answer these empirical questions, household head’s labor market out-
comes – i.e. labor income and employment status – should be interacted with a series
of characteristics that are allegedly a source of heterogeneity. In our case, an issue ap-
pears, in so far household head’s labor market outcomes are instrumented. Following
Wooldridge (2002)25, the interaction terms are thus endogenous, non linear variables.
In Wooldridge’s words, a ‘forbidden regression’ would arise if we interact the exogenous
variables with the predicted value of our instrumented variable of interest. As in the case
of the variable of interest, all of the interaction terms have to be instrumented by an
interaction between the exogenous variables and the instruments. For example, a correct
estimation of the heterogeneous effect of baseline home ownership implies to instrument
husband’s income using the set of instruments IV1, and to instrument the interaction
between husband’s income and the exogenous ownership dummy with the IV1 set itself
interacted with the home ownership dummy.26
Results are presented in Table 13. For the sake of concision, we only display results
using the IV1 set of instruments, and participation decision at the extensive margin.
Only results using husband’s variation in income are presented, because regressions in-
strumenting for husband’s variation in employment status is subject to weakness.
Looking at Panel A, the AWE does not differ according to age categories. There
is no evidence that younger couples use relatively more labor market coping strategies
because they cannot cope against unexpected shocks using savings. Panel B and C show
that the wealth effects associated with the shock varies indeed according to the level of
income at baseline, or according to home ownership. Women belonging to the richest
quartile in 2000-2001 are less likely to enter the labor market and find a job in case their
husband is hit by a shock than women belonging to quartiles 1, 2 and 3. Panel C indicates
that in case households own their dwelling, the AWE is divided by half. Panel D displays
heterogeneity results according to education attainment. The AWE is more important for
lower educational degrees, however this heterogeneity disappears when JJH beneficiaries
are redefined as non-participants. Panel E displays the differences in AWE for childless
couples, couples with at least one child under compulsory schooling age, and couples
with at least one child above schooling age and under 18. Surprisingly, while women with
young children react similarly to unexpected shocks in their husband’s income, women
25Section 9.5 pp. 236-7.
26Because of this complex instrumentation procedure, we study each heterogeneity source separately.
As a consequence, the heterogenous effect of income quartile at baseline is likely to partly capture the
heterogeneous effects of human capital.
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Table 13 – Heterogeneity analysis
Part Part+ Occup Occup+ Full-time
Panel A : Age, woman
Husb. monthly income −0.0189 −0.0405 −0.0230 −0.0446* 0.0114
(−0.70) (−1.51) (−0.89) (−1.76) (0.49)
× aged 16 29 −0.0142 0.0150 −0.00215 0.0271 −0.0205
(−0.56) (0.60) (−0.09) (1.14) (−0.93)
× aged 30 44 −0.00477 0.0167 0.00775 0.0292 −0.00900
(−0.22) (0.76) (0.36) (1.40) (−0.47)
Panel B : Homeownership
Husb. monthly income −0.119*** −0.0667** −0.0925*** −0.0403* −0.0356*
(−4.67) (−2.82) (−3.99) (−1.91) (−1.89)
× owner 0.0587*** 0.0302** 0.0469*** 0.0184 0.0182
(3.82) (2.13) (3.36) (1.46) (1.61)
Panel C: HH income quartile at baseline
Husb. monthly income 0.0201 0.0263 0.0454** 0.0516** 0.0283
(0.98) (1.29) (2.32) (2.69) (1.46)
× income Q1 −0.0388* −0.0419** −0.0568** −0.0599** −0.0342*
(−1.84) (−1.99) (−2.83) (−3.05) (−1.74)
× income Q2 −0.0566** −0.0580** −0.0735*** −0.0749*** −0.0401*
(−2.60) (−2.67) (−3.48) (−3.61) (−1.95)
× income Q3 −0.0178 −0.0211 −0.0394* −0.0428** −0.0253
(−0.79) (−0.94) (−1.84) (−2.01) (−1.16)
Panel D: Education, woman
Husb. monthly income 0.0532** −0.00928 0.0381** −0.0243 0.00898
(2.73) (−0.49) (2.10) (−1.40) (0.52)
× primary degree −0.0679*** −0.00970 −0.0487** 0.00951 −0.0153
(−4.06) (−0.60) (−3.14) (0.64) (−1.03)
× secondary degree −0.0544*** −0.00902 −0.0394** 0.00593 −0.0124
(−4.20) (−0.72) (−3.27) (0.52) (−1.07)
Panel E: Children
Husb. monthly income −0.0919** −0.0667** −0.0563** −0.0310 −0.0376
(−3.11) (−2.29) (−2.07) (−1.19) (−1.53)
× child under 5 0.0153 0.00866 0.00317 −0.00352 0.00478
(1.33) (0.76) (0.30) (−0.35) (0.50)
× child above 5 0.0468** 0.0335* 0.0319* 0.0187 0.0240
(2.43) (1.77) (1.81) (1.10) (1.50)
Panel F: Husb. gets U benefits
Husb. monthly income −0.146*** −0.0722** −0.113*** −0.0391* −0.0332*
(−5.77) (−3.22) (−4.96) (−1.95) (−1.77)
× U benefits 0.111*** 0.0640** 0.0685** 0.0219 0.0158
(4.37) (2.81) (3.11) (1.13) (0.90)
Observations 18755 18755 18755 18755 18755
Notes: See Table 3 and 4. Instruments set is IV1. Because of the complex instrumentation procedure involving en-
dogenous non linear variables, each source of heterogeneity is analysed in a separate regression. When categories
are not binary, reference categories are: age 45-59, superior degree, income Q4, childless couple.
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with children above 5 have a significantly lower AWE. Finally, Panel F indicates that the
AWE is significantly smaller for women whose husband experiences a decrease in labor
income, but is entitled to unemployment insurance or compensation.27
Conclusion
So far, the existing literature on the added worker effect has answered separately two main
questions: (i) do households whose head is hit by an idiosyncratic shock – e.g. unexpected
plant closures in developed countries, or climate shocks in developing countries – respond
by sending additional workers on the labor market? and (ii) in downward business cycles,
is the AWE prevailing over the discouraged worker effect at the aggregate level? This
paper fills the gap between the two literatures and develops an original empirical strategy
to assess the existence and extent of the added-worker shock coping strategy in the
case of an aggregate shock and a macro discouragement effect. Intra-household market
oriented strategies are tricky to measure, because in normal times spouses’ labor supply
is jointly determined, implying that the decision of each spouse is endogenous to the
decision of the other spouse. The dramatic collapse of the convertibility era generates an
aggregate shock presenting asymmetries with respect to economic sectors. This natural
experiment framework is used to instrument for the household head’s endogenous labor
market outcomes. Results points out that even when discouragement prevails at the
aggregate level, there is evidence of an added-worker effect.
In the Argentine case, this AWE is far from negligible. Married women whose
spouse experiences a 30 percent decrease in monthly wage (which correspond to the
sample mean) are 3 percentage points more likely to enter the labor market. When a
husband looses his job, his spouse increases her participation rate by almost 2 percentage
points. The magnitude of this effect reflects the fact that the Argentine state relaxes the
demand side of the labor market by offering workfare programs paid below the market
wage. As a robustness check, we redefined program participants as inactive if they do
not work the legal amount of time to be entitled to the program, or if they do not declare
wishing to work more hours, in order to select out the potential windfall effect created
by the program. The AWE still accounts for a 2 percent increase in female participation
over the period. In line with intuition, this AWE is nonetheless slightly inferior to the
27This result further supports the view that the extra labor supplied by married women is the conse-
quence of an income effect, and not the result of spouses’ joint preference for leisure. Married women
do not enter the labor market to avoid spending time home when their spouse is unemployed, but to
compensate for the income loss.
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one observed during upward business cycle by Cerrutti (2000), even after controlling for
the changes in macroeconomic opportunities over the period. A preliminary analysis at
the intensive margin displays less robust patterns of an ”added hours effect” from the
part of spouses whose husband undergoes a wage decrease or a job loss. Finally, in line
with intuition, the AWE proves to be heterogeneous with respect to home ownership,
household income quartile, education degree, husband’s unemployment insurance, and
the presence of children within the household at baseline.
In a broader perspective, this paper contributes to a recent focus shift in labor
supply studies towards a better understanding of the role of labor supply in mitigating
uncertainty within households over the lifetime. Perhaps surprisingly, shock coping is
still an essential role of the family. Highlighting the existence of a non negligible AWE
is the first step towards a better understanding of intra household coping mechanisms in
emerging economies with embryonic social safety nets. Future work will have to assess the
effectiveness of this AWE in mitigating the impact of the economic downturn. In addition,
a complementary aspect of the AWE is whether the additional workforce actually returns
to inactivity once lost income has been compensated for. From 2003 onwards, Argentine
economy experienced a sudden and radical upward cycle, as displayed in Figure 1. A
possible extension to present work would be to document the decisions of married women
labor supply at the intra-household level, in order to assess whether the added workers
tend to stay in or leave the workforce in a context of drastic economical improvement.
Overall, a correct identification of the interrelations between primary and secondary
earners’ wages, as well as the indirect effects of this intra-household insurance scheme
have important policy implications. The literature on female labor supply generally
proposes alternative welfare fallouts: female participation increases bargaining power,
affecting income allocation between members, but also leads to precarious positions and
overwork (Lim, 2000; Klasen and Pieters, 2012). Design and implementation of welfare
programs have to interfere intelligently in these existing mechanisms.
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Appendix
Table 14 – Construction of the instrumental variables, based on 2002 shock asymetry between
household head sectors: primary and secondary sectors
Prim Goods
Alim Text Chem Metal Other Gas Constr
Shock(2002 = 1) −0.437* −0.413* −0.304 −0.623* −0.847* −0.831* −0.310* −1.027*
(0.145) (0.112) (0.199) (0.170) (0.144) (0.131) (0.100) (0.080)
Constant 5.913* 5.449* 5.483* 6.226* 5.861* 5.661* 6.507* 4.769*
(0.091) (0.068) (0.117) (0.107) (0.087) (0.077) (0.061) (0.049)
Observations 594 585 282 253 690 723 287 3291
Prim Goods
Alim Text Chem Metal Other Gas Constr
IV1
Exposed sector a 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
IV2
Exposure intensity b −0.437 −0.413 −0.304 −0.623 −0.847 −0.831 −0.310 −1.027
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the indi-
vidual level.
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